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Abstract
This paper explores the implications for public policy of the fact that individuals know more than
the authorities about their exposure to infectious disease and can take migration decisions before
their health status is publicly observable. In a 2-period model we study conditions under which
the presence of quarantine measures may lead to ine¢ cient outcomes by strengthening individuals
interest in migration to escape centres of disease and thereby imposing negative externalities on other
uninfected individuals. We show rst that when the disease has an epicentre, the marginal migrant
imposes a net negative externality. Secondly, quarantine policies may sometimes encourage migration
instead of discouraging it. Thirdly, even when they succeed in discouraging migration, quarantine
policies may lower social welfare, and even increase overall disease incidence, if they go too far, thereby
discouraging those intra-marginal migrants for whom private benets exceed private costs by more
than the negative externality they impose on others.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of public policies to restrict migration by individuals suspected of carrying
disease, when those individuals have more information than the authorities about their probability of
being carriers. It has long been known that migration a¤ects the spread of disease, and this inuence has
for centuries been used to justify placing restrictions on the movement of individuals suspected of carrying
infections1 . For example, immigrants to the United States were screened for disease on Ellis Island and
sometimes kept in quarantine until considered safe for the rest of the population (for a detailed description
of how migrants were screened when leaving their origin country and at their arrival on Ellis Island, see
Markel and Stern, 2002). Epidemiological studies have addressed how individual behaviour, among other
factors, a¤ects the spread of infections. However, the study of how individual behaviour in turn changes
in response to the new incentives created by the occurrence of a disease is much less developed. The
principal contribution of our paper is to bring the study of strategic behavior under uncertainty into
the domain of epidemiology, and to analyze its impact, in interaction with public policies, on the overall
impact of epidemic disease.
To our knowledge the work that has been done to date on strategic behavior in the context of disease
considers the economic determinants of preventive behaviour such as vaccination or the adoption of
safe sex. In particular, Philipson (2000) and Geo¤ard and Philipson (1996) show that, if demand for
prevention treatments such as vaccines is prevalence elastic, then initially successful public health e¤orts
typically run into diminishing returns, not simply for technical reasons but because the decline of a disease
discourages prevention. Similar considerations apply to the factors determining the adoption of means of
contraception such as barrier methods for Sexually Transmissible Diseases or the choice of partners (see
for example, Kremer, 1996), and a growing literature now focuses on the microeconomic determinants of
such individual decisions, in order to reach a better understanding of epidemiological patterns.
However, migration as a form of preventive behaviour has received very little attention, although
evidence has accumulated that migration behaviour and epidemics are intrinsically linked. Migration
behaviour can respond very rapidly to changes in the health environment, in particular when it suddenly
deteriorates through epidemics. There are numerous historical instances of people eeing plague or other
infectious diseases by migrating to distant areas (see McNeill, 1997). During the Black Death, for instance,
inhabitants from infected villages migrated to less infected villages in the neighbourhood. Much more
recently, after the SARS outbreak in China, workers in urban areas were returned in large numbers to
live with their families in safer rural areas2 .
Such behavioural responses are important for understanding the e¤ectiveness of policy measures, in
the context of an increasing demand for national and international regulation of disease control, especially
1The rst international regulations on health were adopted by twelve European states during a conference held in Paris in
1851 following the failure of the early public health strategies using quarantine and lazarettosto prevent the importation
of contagious diseases through the Mediterranean region. 137 regulations dealing with health issues for maritime tra¢ c
included articles that specically mentioned plague, yellow fever and cholera, diseases for which international regulations
and requirements continued until the late 20th century.
2 see Le Point, 16 Mai 2003 pp50-51
2
given the very real fear that antibiotic resistance will soon lead to the recurrence of old diseases no longer
curable by antibiotics and the emergence of new diseases that make regions such as Europe and North
America more vulnerable to epidemics than they have been in the past.
Recently, the outbreak of SARS in China and its rapid transmission across the world (principally
via air travel) demonstrated both the dramatic consequences of the lack of reporting by one state, and,
subsequently, the e¤ectiveness of strict health regulations applied quickly and simultaneously in di¤erent
countries.
Even if it would be premature to draw conclusions regarding the long-term evolution of SARS, at
least one question needs to be addressed urgently. How e¤ective are quarantine measures and in what
circumstances do they work best? Such measures have often been considered as the most e¢ cient way
to prevent individuals in an infected area from moving to a non infected area, and they continue to be
used as a systematic response to epidemic outbreaks. For example, when the Black Plague arrived in
Milan, three households were infected. The authorities immediately bricked up the doors and windows,
leaving the human beings and the rats to their fate. "All perished and Milan was spared", as revealed
by historical chronicles (for a review of these, see Benedictow, 2004).
But what happens if individuals have more accurate information on their risk probability than the
state health authorities, and use this information asymmetry strategically? Can economists warn policy
makers about unexpected e¤ects of quarantine regulations, taking into account that individual behaviour
changes in response to policy regulations? The aim of the paper is to study the possibility of such e¤ects,
which, to our knowledge, have not yet been considered in the debates on health and migration3 .
We develop a framework where migration responds to the prevalence of disease, to health regulations,
and to the costs of migration. In the absence of quarantine regulations, the di¤erence in disease prevalence
between two areas provides the sole motive for migration and individuals choose whether or not to migrate
by balancing the health benets of doing so against the monetary (and possibly non-monetary) costs. An
important assumption is that individuals may know more about their risk characteristics than the health
authorities. This assumption does not contradict the fact that health authorities have, or may have,
considerable experience, as well as statistical information, about earlier outbreaks of a disease, including
its rate of propagation and incubation periods. We simply assume here that individuals know more about
their idiosyncratic risk of being infected since they know more about their own characteristics (their past
locations, personal habits, living conditions, networks etc...), whereas health authorities can only observe
individualshealth status with a lag, once symptoms appear. This creates an asymmetry of information
that has potentially important consequences for the e¤ect of quarantine measures. It also means that the
risk characteristics of individuals who migrate may di¤er in important ways from those of the general
population, a fact that may have a signicant impact on the subsequent evolution of the disease.
At this stage we do not study the e¤ects of quarantine measures in general, many of which a¤ect
the mobility of goods (for a study of the e¤ects of a ban on import of goods, see Anderson and James,
3See for example the review Health and Migrationpublished by the International Organization for Migration
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1998). But we study the e¤ects of specic quarantine measures that a¤ect the mobility of individuals and
are taken by the health authorities of the country harbouring the focus of the disease, such as the ones
taken recently by the Chinese authorities or, later on, by the Canadian authorities after the outbreak
of SARS4 . We show merely that behavioural responses to actual interventions may lead to perverse or
undesirable e¤ects, and that these are more likely when the period during which individuals have more
information about their infection risk than the authorities is long relative to the speed of propagation
of the disease. Such e¤ects are therefore more likely for diseases such as HIV/AIDS than for Ebola or
SARS, with tuberculosis being an intermediate case.
Our model is very simple, and unrealistic in a number of ways that enable us to nd analytical
solutions. However, it illustrates three very useful and intuitive principles which apply much more
generally than in this particular context, and which we believe will be helpful to analysts and policymakers
in thinking about the impact of public policies towards disease. When disease incidence di¤ers from one
place to another, decisions to migrate involve private benets and costs to the individual concerned which
include changes in their risk of catching the disease. They also impose externalities on others, externalities
that are negative and increasing in the number of uninfected individuals with which the migrant comes
into contact, in the infectiousness of the disease, and in the probability that the migrant is a carrier. This
much is uncontroversial. In our model we show that
 First, when the disease is concentrated in one place (the epicentre of an epidemic for instance), a
decision to migrate away from the epicentre brings a potentially infected individual in contact with
more uninfected individuals than she would have met had she remained where she was. Thus the
typical migrant imposes a net negative externality as a result of her decision to migrate, and the
marginal migrant (for whom, by denition, private benets of migrating just equal the private costs
of doing so) has a negative impact on social welfare. Laissez-faire will therefore lead to excessive
migration. This provides a rationale for the frequent (and frequently justied) public policy response
to epidemics, which is to attempt to restrict migration away from the epicentre by those who may
be infected.
 Secondly, and less obviously, not all policies that aim to restrict migration in fact do so. In particular,
we distinguish two e¤ects of quarantine policies. The rst is that they raise migration costs, which
lowers migration. For example, mandatory health certicates or test results may be required by
health authorities to leave the epicentre of the disease. We call this a type 1quarantine measure.
Another e¤ect might be to impose a utility cost on individuals of remaining in the city where
quarantine measures are e¤ective, since they face a chance of being subjected to awkward and
possibly dangerous restrictions on their movements. We call this a type 2quarantine measure.
Such measures impose a welfare cost on those who su¤er them, which tends to increase migration
4We aknowledge that, in the past, most measures taken at the national level to stop the spread of a disease have been
taken by the authorities of the countries which people are trying to reach. But given the increased need of controlling diseases
at the international level, pressures on the authorities of the country harbouring the infectious diseases have increased.
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by those who are not currently subject to quarantine but fear they may become so if they remain
where they are. This second e¤ect will be stronger if individuals have more information than the
authorities about their prior exposure to the disease. Policies implemented without taking this
e¤ect into account may therefore have e¤ects that are opposite from those intended.
 Thirdly, even policies that actually reduce migration may have an adverse impact on social welfare if
they reduce migration too much, and specically if they discourage those intra-marginal migrants
whose private benets from migration substantially exceed their private costs of migration, by
enough to outweigh the negative externality they impose on others. Overall disease prevalence may
even increase if in the name of avoiding negative externalities the authorities discourage relatively
low-risk individuals from escaping the epicentre of the disease, thereby increasing the probability
that they will catch the disease there from infected individuals.
The design of quarantine policies needs therefore to be sensitive to the actual incentives for or against
migration created by those policies, as well as to the need to consider the impact on intra-marginal as well
as on marginal migrants. These messages, we believe, have an importance and relevance that extends far
beyond the rather special circumstances of our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set out the assumptions of a two-period model in
which individuals face a choice of whether to migrate between two areas that di¤er in the prevalence of
disease. In Section 3 we discuss the welfare implications of migration decisions and public policy using
simple illustrative examples. In Section 4 we use the model to study in more general cases the welfare
impacts of di¤erent types of quarantine measures, before concluding in Section 5.
2 The Model
There are two cities, a and b, each containing a continuum of inhabitants. There are two time periods,
t = 0; 1. The size of the population in period 0 is normalized to 1 in city a and N in city b, with
N > 1. Apart from their size and their number of infected individuals, the two cities are identical. At
the outbreak of the epidemic at period 0, ra and rb inhabitants are infected by the disease in city a and
city b respectively; we assume that ra > rb, with minimal loss of generality since all it implies is that
the initial population in which an epidemic is concentrated (the epicentre) is small relative to the total
potentially infected population. We also call ra and rb the initial prevalence levelsof the disease in the
two cities. However, individuals may choose to migrate between the cities and this will a¤ect prevalence
levels in the second period. In equilibrium, and as a result of the various decisions a¤ecting migration
made by individuals and by the authorities, there will be Na and Nb inhabitants infected by the disease
in the two cities in period 1.
We write sijt 2 (h; s) for the state of health of individual i in city j in period t, where h is the healthy
state and s is the sick state. An individual does not know her own state of health in period 0, learning
this only in period 1. However, everyone (individuals plus the authorities) knows the prevalence rates of
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the disease ra and rb.
Nevertheless, individuals know something important that the authorities do not know, namely the
extent of their prior exposure to the disease, which we interpret simply as the probability that they have
already caught the disease in period 0. We will see that such asymmetric information may generate
ine¢ ciencies due to problems of adverse selection, if enough care is not taken in the design of policy
measures. We write eij for the exposure of individual i in city j (it will often be convenient to drop the
subscript j without risk of confusion); in the analysis below we make a variety of di¤erent assumptions
about how eij is distributed across individuals. In addition, exposure may or may not a¤ect the risk of
developing the disease in the future, as follows:
 For what we call type-insensitive epidemics, the risk for a previously uninfected individual of
catching the disease in period 1 depends only on the infectiousness  of the disease, and on the
number of infected individuals Nj in the city where she decides to live5 . The natural interpretation
of this is that the factors a¤ecting previous exposure are purely random and have no bearing on
the individuals future risk of catching the disease. Formally, we write this as follows:
pr(sijt+1 = sjsijt = h) = Nj (1)
 For a type-sensitive epidemic, however, the risk of future infection will depend on the same
factors that determined past exposure. A good example would be a disease such as AIDS in which
individual sexual behavior determines exposure, so that those whose behavior makes them more
likely to have been infected in the past are also, if still uninfected, more likely to become infected in
the future for given prevalence levels. For simplicity we suppose that the risk of future infection of a
healthy individual is simply proportional to past exposure (as well as to the disease- and city-specic
factors just described):
pr(sijt+1 = sjsijt = h) = eijNj (2)
However, even without proportionality the qualitative insights of the model would remain unchanged
so long as risk is increasing in past exposure.
The fact that the risk of infection is increasing in the prevalence of the disease in the chosen city
is important because it implies that individuals will choose whether or not to migrate between cities in
response to di¤erences in the prevalence levels6 . However, not all individuals will make the same choices,
not (in our simple framework) because of di¤erences in their migration costs or in their ability to a¤ord
5The equations would be more complex and non-linear if we assumed that the risk depended not on the number but on
the proportion of infected individuals in the city in question. However, we have no reason to think that this would a¤ect the
qualitative insights of the model, and the absolute numbers assumption has a natural interpretation: in a city centre which
every citizen passes, the risk of infection is a function of the total number of dangerous pathogens in the environment, not
the proportion of dangerous ones to innocuous ones.
6We deliberately ignore here the possibility that cities may di¤er in the quality of preventive or curative medical care
available. It is possible that cities with high disease prevalence may be more, not less attractive to uninfected individuals,
for instance if they also o¤er vaccination whose e¤ects outweigh those of greater disease prevalence, or if prior residence
is a condition of access to treatment. This qualication should be borne in mind when interpreting our results, though
historically we do not believe such phenomena have been common.
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those costs, since we assume migration costs and incomes to be identical across individuals. Rather,
their choices will di¤er because of their prior exposure to the disease. This happens in two ways. First,
individuals are more likely to migrate, other things equal, if they have had lower prior exposure, since
that increases the probability that they are healthy - only healthy individuals are at risk of catching
the disease since infected individuals have caught it already. Secondly, under type-sensitive epidemics,
individuals are more likely to migrate if their individual exposure is higher, since it makes them more
sensitive to the environment in which they live. This means, other things equal, that migration is more
likely given higher past exposure. The net impact of these two e¤ects will be considered in more detail
below.
3 Migration, welfare and quarantine: simple examples
Individual migration decisions a¤ect social welfare and not just individual welfare. This is because
they generate externalities - in this framework because an infected individual creates a risk for the
uninfected individuals that surround her (the migration decision of an uninfected individual creates no
externalities). However, asymmetric information about this risk makes it impossible for the authorities to
correct perfectly for these externalities, since they know neither the health status of individuals nor their
prior exposure before they migrate. If individuals did not know these things either, there would be no
public policy issue since there would be equal uncertainty faced by everyone. Conversely, if individuals
knew everything - and specically, if they knew their own health status - there would be no public
policy issue either, since infected individuals, who are the only ones whose migration decision creates
externalities, would have no incentive to migrate. It is the fact that individuals know some things the
authorities do not know, but do not know everything, that creates the really interesting public policy
problem in our framework.
To see this, consider the case of type-insensitive epidemics (the argument is similar but more elaborate
for the case of type-sensitive epidemics). Denote by d the utility costs of being infected, m the migration
costs, y the per capita income generated in each city, and ns (nh) the number of sick (healthy) individuals
who migrate from city a to b. To ensure that at least one individual will be better o¤migrating we assume
that
m < d(ra   rb) (3)
The objective of public policy is to minimize I, the sum of the utility costs of infection plus the costs of
migration. We can write I = d(Na +Nb) +m(nh + ns) with Na +Nb being the total number of infected
individuals living in both cities.
As, after migration, Na = (1 ra nh) (ra   ns) ns+ra and Nb = (N rb+nh) (rb + ns)+ns+rb,
it is easy to derive
dI
dnh
= d (rb   ra + 2ns) +m
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and show that, for ns small, dIdnh < 0 as condition (3) holds. Moreover,
dI
dns
> 0 as:
dI
dns
= d (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh) +m
Therefore public policy should minimize the number of sick migrants, ns, which optimally should be
equal to 0; and maximize the number of healthy migrants, nh.
These optimal migration ows come from the specication of the infection function (equation 1),
which implies that the total number of infected individuals is minimized when healthy individuals go to
the city with fewer sick individuals and when sick individuals stay in the city with a high number of
infected individuals.
However, since the authorities do not know the health status of each individual, they can only apply
policy measures (such as quarantine) that in principle a¤ect both healthy and sick individuals. Further-
more, individuals will react to those measures on the basis of their own prior exposure, which a¤ects their
gains from migration. But there is asymmetric information about these prior exposure levels - individuals
with di¤erent exposures may react di¤erently to the same measure, although the authorities cannot tell
the individuals apart. As in many contexts with asymmetric information this will give rise to ine¢ cient
outcomes.
To see how this might happen, consider a simple example (still in the context of type-insensitive
epidemics). Assume that individuals migrate from one city to another on the basis of current prevalence
levels in the two cities. This is an over-simplication because it ignores the way in which individuals
anticipate future evolution of prevalence levels, and we shall relax this assumption in Section 4, but it is
useful for understanding the kinds of perverse e¤ect that can result from well-intentioned public policy
interventions.
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses to migrate is written as7 :
Um =  m+ ei(y   d) + rb(1  ei)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  rb)y
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses not to migrate is:
Un = ei(y   d) + ra(1  ei)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  ra)y
So individual i will wish to migrate as long as:
m < (1  ei)(ra   rb)d (4)
Equation (4) shows that individual i will wish to migrate to the low prevalence city as long as the
migration cost, m, is smaller than the migration benet (on the right hand side of the inequality). This
benet is higher the lower is prior exposure ei and the higher the di¤erence between prevalence rates in
the two cities. From this it follows that all individuals having an exposure factor below e = 1  md(ra rb)
migrate to the low infected city.
7Results would have been the same, if, instead of assuming risk neutrality, we had assumed that all individuals had the
same degree of risk aversion. Moreover, we ignore the e¤ect of heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion in order to focus
on one dimension of heterogeneity, that is in the degree of exposure to risk.
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Consider a policy intervention such as quarantine. What kinds of e¤ect might this have? As we
discussed above, quarantine measures of type 1might raise the migration cost, thus lowering e and
hence decreasing the number of migrants. Another e¤ect might be to impose a utility cost on individuals
of remaining in city a, which we characterised as type 2measures. Writing this utility cost as q we can
dene the post-quarantine threshold as e = 1  m qd(ra rb) , and we see that e > e so that the number
of migrants increases.
In fact quarantine measures could actually lower social welfare if inappropriately implemented. Sup-
pose that prior exposure levels are distributed discretely so that there are two types of individual, the
high-risk and the low-risk types. Formally, ei  feL; eHg. Assume also that prequarantine, the marginal
migrant is such that eL < e < eH :
Without quarantine measures, low risk individuals migrate to city b whereas high risk individuals stay
in city a. This is e¢ cient provided low-risk individuals are su¢ ciently low-risk: the benet to them of
escaping exposure to the high-risk individuals in city a outweighs the negative externality they impose
on the larger numbers of uninfected individuals in city b than there are in city a.
If, after quarantine measures of type 2 are implemented, the marginal migrant is such that eL < eH <
e; then high risk individuals are also encouraged to migrate, which may increase the total number of
infected individuals and, hence, decreases total welfare. So, in this case, social welfare is higher when the
the authorities do not intervene than when they do.
We are not, of course, suggesting that all policy interventions in the presence of epidemic diseases
will be self-defeating. On the contrary, it is likely that laissez-faire will be ine¢ cient because of the
externalities imposed by the sick on the healthy. However, our example has shown that devising policies
that actually improve matters is not a straightforward task. The next section will illustrate this in a
more general framework.
4 Migration and welfare under rational expectations
Unlike in our example, we now assume that migrants have rational expectations about prevalence rates
in the two cities in period 1. That is, when they make their migration decisions in period 0 they do
not assume that current prevalence rates will continue to hold in the future; they take into account that
others are reasoning as they do. The rationale for this is not necessarily that individuals are perfectly
far-sighted but rather that it determines a migration equilibrium, such that, after migration takes place,
no individuals have any further interest in migrating, once they have taken into account the migration
behaviour of other individuals. We now use the model to look in more detail at welfare questions, beginning
with type-insensitive diseases. We consider both discrete and continuous (uniform) distributions of prior
exposure, and show that this makes a di¤erence to the impact of policy.
4.1 Type-insensitive infections
We begin by setting out individual migration incentives.
9
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses to migrate is written as:
Um =  m+ ei(y   d) + (1  ei)(rb + ns)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  (rb + ns))y
The utility if an individual of type ei chooses not to migrate is:
Un = ei(y   d) + (1  ei)(ra   ns)(y   d) + (1  ei)(1  (ra   ns))y
So individual i will wish to migrate as long as:
m < (1  ei)(ra   rb   2ns)d (5)
Note that this di¤ers from equation 4 by the inclusion of the term 2ns - the migrant takes into account
that others like herself will be migrating between periods 0 and 1.
To ensure that at least one individual will wish to migrate we assume that
m < (1  e)(ra   rb   2ns)d (6)
with e being the lowest value of ei in city a.
We can study the impact of quarantine measures on migration incentives in general, without solving
for the migration equilibrium level, ns, by dening the exposure level e of the marginal migrant, such
that migration incentives, dened by equation (5), equal to 0 as:
e = 1  m
d(ra   rb   2ns)
a) if quarantine measures of type 1 are implemented, so that migration cost is now m0 > m, the
marginal migrant is now dened by e = 1   m0d(ra rb 2ns) and we see that e < e so that migration
has decreased.
b) if quarantine measures of type 2 are implemented, so that there is a utility cost q to remaining in
city a, the marginal migrant is now dened by e = 1  m qd(ra rb 2ns) and we see that e > e, so that
migration has increased.
Of course, in the denition of these thresholds the number of migrants, ns; is endogenous. We now
take this endogeneity into account in order to establish the following propositions. Proposition 1 denes
parameter values for which there exist no welfare-improving interventions:
Proposition 1: If exposure levels are discretely distributed between two types, so that the exposure
factor ei  feL; eHg with p the proportion of individuals with low exposure level, and if eL < 1  
m
d(ra rb 2peL) < eH , then:
a) the unique laissez-faire equilibrium has migration by all and only the low-exposure individuals, and
there exists a threshold t such that if eL < t this outcome is second-best optimal8 , where t is the lower
root of the quadratic equation (A+BeL + Ce2L) = 0; where
8What we mean by "second-best" optimality is optimal "in the set of feasible policies where the government can control
m and q".
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A  mp  dp(ra   rb);
B  d(N   1 + 2p+ 2(ra   rb));
C  2pd;
b) if a quarantine intervention of type 1 raises migration cost to m0 such that eL > 1  m0d(ra rb) , the
unique equilibrium has zero migration by both exposure types, which if eL < t is second-best sub-optimal
since low-risk types are not separated from high-risk types;
c) if a quarantine intervention of type 2 imposes a disutility cost of q on sick individuals in city
a such that eH < 1   m qd(ra rb 2peL) , there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies, and the sole
equilibrium has a proportion  < 1 of high-risk types migrating, with  solution to the equation
1   m qd(ra rb 2peL 2(1 p)eH) = eH . If eL < t this is also suboptimal since a proportion of high-risk
types are not separated from low-risk types.
Proof: Appendix
What does this Proposition tell us? Migration entails two types of change in welfare. First, migration
imposes a negative externality as migrants will encounter a larger number of healthy individuals in the
destination area than in their area of origin, thereby increasing the overall exposure of others to infection
risk. Secondly, all migrants have a net positive private gain from migration as the distribution of
exposure levels is discrete (so that migrants are all infra-marginal individuals, who gain a strictly positive
private benet from migrating). Proposition 1a simply says that, if low type individuals are low risk
enough, the negative externality is more than compensated by the positive privategains, and migration
of low type individuals increases overall social welfare. From this it follows naturally that, in this case,
discouraging low type individuals by quarantine measures of type 1 worsens social welfare (Proposition
1b) and that, encouraging high type individuals to migrate by quarantine measures of type 2 worsens
social welfare (Proposition 1c), as high risk individuals who migrate entail excessive negative externalities.
Proposition 2 establishes conditions under which welfare-improving interventions may exist:
Proposition 2: If exposure levels are discretely distributed between two types, so that the exposure
factor ei  feL; eHg with p the proportion of individuals with low exposure level, then:
a) if 1   md(ra rb 2peL) < eL < eH , no individuals migrate, which is sub-optimal if eL < t , but
a second-best optimal migration can be induced by a quarantine intervention of type 2 such that m  
d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eH) > q > m  d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL);
b) if eL < eH < 1   md(ra rb 2peL) , there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies, and the sole
equilibrium has all low-risk types migrating and a proportion  < 1 of high-risk types migrating, with 
the solution to the equation 1  md(ra rb 2peL 2(1 p)eH) = eH .
If eL < t , second-best optimal migration can be induced by a quarantine intervention of type 1 such
that d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL) > m > d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eH);
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c) if eL  t the second-best optimum has zero migration, which can be induced by a quarantine
intervention of type 1 such that m > d(ra   rb   2peL) (1  eL).
Proof: Follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Note that even where welfare-improving policy interventions exist they must be carefully designed to
encourage only low type individuals to migrate. The quarantine measure should not "overshoot", moving
from a situation in which neither type of individual migrates to one in which both types migrate, or vice
versa - unless even the low-risk types are su¢ ciently high-risk that it is better for society that they do
not migrate at all.
Once again, the details of the policy matter, and policies devised with good intentions but without
attention to detail may end up being ine¤ective or even making things worse.
We now consider the more interesting case where the exposure factor ei is uniformly distributed over
[0; e].
Without quarantine measures, the total number of migrants is ns+nh = e

e and nh =
e
e (1  e

2 ) and
ns =
e2
2e where
e
2 is the average exposure in the pool of migrants.
From (5) we can derive the threshold exposure factor dening the marginal migrant:
e = 1  m
d(ra   rb   e2e )
e is the only real solution such that  6= 0 and d 6= 0 of the following cubic equation :
ed(ra   rb   e
2
e
) =

d(ra   rb   e
2
e
) m

(7)
Public policy will aim to minimize I = d(Na +Nb) +m e

e :
Proposition 3: When exposure levels are uniformly distributed over [0; e]:
a) All individuals below the threshold exposure factor dened implicitely by e = 1   m
d(ra rb  e2e )
will migrate to the low prevalence city.
b) there exists a unique exposure threshold emin, which minimizes I.
c) emin < e, so that migration under laissez-faire is too high as compared to this optimum.
Proof: Appendix
More generally, the intuition of the results for a continuous distribution of exposure levels follows the
intuition for the discrete case with one important di¤erence: the marginal migrant has, by denition,
no private gains from migration. Therefore the marginal migrant entails, in this case, net overall social
welfare losses, as migration still entails negative externalities and private gains are zero.
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It follows immediately that type 1 quarantine measures may be able to implement the optimum while
type 2 measures cannot, though once again the type 1 measures must not be too stringent or they will
overshoot.
4.2 Type sensitive infections
We now turn to type-sensitive infections. These make the migration incentives more complicated, so we
rst solve for the new migration thresholds.
Using equation 1 instead of equation 2, the gains from migration to individual i become
 m+ ei(1  ei)(ra   rb   2ns)d (8)
where ns is endogenous, and will depend, once again on the distribution of exposure levels.
From this we can state:
Proposition 4: When epidemics are type-sensitive, migrants have rational expectations and exposure
levels are discretely distributed, so that ei  feL; eHg with a proportion p of individuals of low type in
city 0:
a) for any given migration cost m and migration level ns, there exist two thresholds e0
and e1, which are solutions to the quadratic equation ei e2i = m=(ra rb 2ns); such that any individual
of risk type ei  [e0; e1] chooses to migrate;
b) therefore either type, no type or both types may migrate in equilibrium, depending
on where the two risk types are situated with respect to these thresholds.
An illustration of the migration thresholds is given in the gure below.
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exposure levels : ei
migration benefits
migration costs
e1e0
The intuition of the welfare analysis for type insensitive epidemics when exposure levels were discretely
distributed continues to hold in this case : there are some cases where policy measures may be welfare
improving and other cases where policy measures may be welfare decreasing. Once again this will depend
on where the low and high types individuals are positioned compared to the two migration thresholds;
on how low low type individuals are; and on how policy measures are designed to a¤ect migration costs
or/and the disutility of living in the epicentre of the disease.
When types are continuously distributed, any change in migration cost will change the number of
migrants in the neighborhood of both the low and the high thresholds. At laissez faire equilibrium,
marginal migrants at both ends of the distribution will impose negative externalities through encountering
a larger number of healthy individuals in the destination area than in their area of origin, thereby
increasing the overall exposure of others to infection risk. At the same time, private gains of migration
are zero at both migration thresholds. So, overall, there is always too muchmigration under laissez-
faire when the distribution of exposure levels is continuous and the same policy implications follow as for
a continuous distribution in the case of type insensitive epidemics.
It should be noted, however, that the magnitude of the externality imposed by the marginal migrants
at the upper and lower thresholds respectively is not the same, since migrants at the high threshold
increase the prevalence rate in the destination city by more than migrants at the low threshold. This
means that any policy that imposes the same cost on all migrants (as is likely given the authorities
inability to distinguish risk types of apparently healthy individuals) will be ine¢ cient compared to an
optimal Pigouvian-type tax that taxed each individual according to the externality she imposed on others.
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Such a Pigouvian policy is infeasible here, which is one of the di¢ culties faced by public intervention in
this context.
The point remains that policy needs to be designed with a careful attention to detail - not only can
quarantine measures encourage instead of discourage migration, but their marginal impact may a¤ect
individuals with quite di¤erent categories of risk exposure, with consequently quite di¤erent impacts on
the welfare of others.
5 Discussions and conclusion
Our model has highlighted the fact that the e¤ectiveness of quarantine measures in the presence of
epidemics are highly sensitive both to the type of the disease and to the distribution of prior exposure
levels.
We began by looking at "type-insensitive infections", for which the future risk of being infected does
not depend on factors that determined an individuals past exposure to infection, but only on disease-
and city-specic factors. These have the characteristic that migrants are those who are less likely to
be infected than non-migrants - that is, there is a threshold of prior exposure below which individuals
migrate and above which they do not.
We show that the e¤ectiveness of policy measures will depend crucially on the distribution of prior
exposure levels. If it is discrete - with high-exposure and low-exposure types - and if the exposure of the
low types is su¢ ciently low, e¢ cient policy involves migration by the low-exposure and non-migration by
the high-exposure types. Thus e¢ cient policy will depend on where the laissez-faire migration threshold
lies with respect to the exposure levels of the two types. If the exposure of the low types is su¢ ciently
low and if the migration threshold lies between the two types, nothing should be done. If it lies above
the high-exposure level, then migration should be made more di¢ cult, by raising its cost, while if it lies
below the low-exposure level then migration should be made easier, by lowering its cost.
If prior exposure levels are continuously distributed, on the other hand, we show that migration
is always too high relative to the optimum as the negative externalities it imposes are greater than
its zero net private benets. Policy should therefore aim to discourage migration, by raising its cost. It
should avoid perversely encouraging migration (for example by raising the cost to individuals of becoming
infected in the origin city). We show also that quarantine measures should not be too stringent, or they
will overshoot.
We then turned to "type-sensitive" infections, for which the risk of infection depends also on factors
that determined individual past exposure to infection (such as individual sexual behaviour in the case
of STDs), and for which migration incentives become more complicated. As in the type-insensitive case,
high-exposure individuals do not migrate since they are likely already to have the disease. However,
low-exposure individuals do not migrate either, since their low exposure is linked to behavior that makes
them less likely to acquire the disease in the future. We show that those who migrate are of intermediate
exposure levels - those who lie between a lower and an upper threshold.
15
We also show that the intuition of the welfare analysis and the resulting policy implications continue to
hold in the case of type sensitive epidemics. In the case where exposure is discretely distributed, optimal
policy will depend on where the high- and low-type exposure levels lie with respect to the two migration
thresholds and on whether the exposure of the low types is su¢ ciently low; either encouragement or
discouragement of migration could be desirable depending on the circumstances. When exposure is
continuously distributed, discouraging migration discourages additional migrants at both the high-and
low-risk parts of the distribution, but, at both parts of the distribution, the marginal migrant entails
too much migrationunder laissez-faire.
In a nutshell the results of the welfare analysis show that, whether future risk is unrelated or related
to past exposure, the migration threshold will be too high if exposure levels are continuously distributed,
leading to excessive migration under laissez-faire. Otherwise migration may be either too high or too low
depending on circumstances.
Simple as it is, this two-period model indicates that asymmetries of information between individuals
and the authorities about their health risks may encourage perverse responses to policy measures such as
quarantine. It has shown that certain kinds of quarantine measure can have some intriguingly perverse
consequences. Although quarantine of individuals who have been identied as sick reduces (obviously)
the propensity of these individuals to migrate and spread the disease, the threat of quarantine increases
the propensity to migrate of other individuals who have not yet been fallen sick but who know themselves
to be at risk.9 This is surely one of the reasons why the health authorities in Toronto encouraged self-
applied quarantine measures after the SARS outbreak. The idea was to encourage individuals voluntarily
to adopt quarantine measures and go to the hospitals to get preventive treatment in case they were at
risk of having been infected.
How important these perverse e¤ects are in practice will clearly depend on the degree of information
asymmetry between individuals and the authorities, which will depend on the nature of the disease. This
will also depend on how long is the incubation period of the disease during which such asymmetries can
be expected to last. That diseases di¤er greatly in the extent of such asymmetries explains, among other
reasons, why quarantine may be comparatively e¤ective at halting the spread of a disease such as SARS,
while it would be ine¤ective or even counter-productive at halting the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Similar considerations apply to many of the other new pathogens that have emerged in the last
25 years, including not only the Ebola virus, HIV and Hepatitis C but also lesser known pathogens
such as Legionella pneumophilia, E coli 0157:H7, Borrelia burgdorferi, Helicobacter pylori, Hantavirus,
Cryptosporidia, Ehrlichiosis, H5N1 (or Avian u), and Nipah. Most of these pathogens have incubation
periods greater than standard travel times. For example, after the SARS virus enters the body, it
requires 3-10 days incubation period before the disease appears, which is much longer than the duration
9For an account of the reactions of individuals to this type of quarantine restrictions during the SARS epidemic in China,
including ways in which restrictions were evaded, see In Liaoning by Jon Cannon, London Review of Books, 25(11), 5
June 2003.
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of any trip by air. Hence an adequate response to the outbreak is indeed to encourage individuals to go to
health centers when they suspect they may have been infected with SARS, instead of applying traditional
non-voluntary quarantine measures to restrict migration away from the epicentre by those who may be
infected10 .
We may also want to consider the case of re-emerging infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis,
dengue, yellow fever or cholera. However, for these diseases, it may be important to consider disease
prevalence as a more long-term characteristic of a given area and, hence, a determinant of both the
long-term location of individuals and the development process, as we study in a companion paper on
migration and endemic disease, Mesnard and Seabright (2008).
We cannot claim to have done more than indicate in a simple and stylized context the complexity of
the considerations that public health policies must take into account, but we hope to have shown that
when individuals have private information about their exposure to disease, their strategic behaviour may
have important e¤ects on public health outcomes that policymakers cannot a¤ord to ignore. Furthermore,
some much simpler and more general messages can be derived than just the conclusion that everything
is complicated and the authorities need to take the specic circumstances of the disease into account. As
we stated in the introduction, three principles in particular apply much more widely than in the specic
circumstances of our model. First, when the disease has an epicentre, the marginal migrant imposes a
net negative externality. Secondly, quarantine policies may encourage migration instead of discouraging
it, specically on the part of individuals who are not currently sick but fear they may become so in the
future. Thirdly, even when they succeed in discouraging migration, quarantine policies may lower social
welfare, and even increase overall disease incidence, if they go too far, thereby discouraging those intra-
marginal migrants for whom private benets substantially exceed private costs, by enough to outweigh
the negative externality they impose on others. These principle are ones that could help in designing
better quarantine policies even in circumstances to which the assumptions of our model do not literally
apply.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
a) From the conditions on eL and eH it follows immediately that all and only low-exposure individuals
migrate. Thus ns = peL and nh = p (1  eL) and we can dene I, the intermediate migrationsocial
disutility level, by
I = mp+ d [(1  ra   p (1  eL)) (ra   peL)+ ra   peL+
(N   rb + p (1  eL)) (rb + peL)+ rb + peL]
We rst show that this is lower than the no-migration level, dened by :
I0 = d [(1  ra) (ra)+ ra + (N   rb) (rb)+ rb]
Subtracting yields:
I   I0 = p(A+BeL + Ce2L); where
A  m  d(ra   rb);
B  d(N   1 + 2p+ 2(ra   rb));
C   2pd:
Noting that equation 5 implies that A < 0, that B > 0 because N > 1 and ra > rb, and that C < 0, it
follows that A+BeL +Ce2L is a quadratic function with a negative intercept, which admits two positive
real roots. Substituting eL = 1 and noting that A+B +C > 0, we can show that, for eL = 1; I   I0 is
positive. So only one of the two roots lies between 0 and 1 . We denote this root t:
Therefore I   I0 is negative if eL < t where t is the lower root of the quadratic equation A+BeL +
Ce2L = 0:
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To see that I is also lower than the all-migration level Ia in which all individuals leave city a for city
1, note that as nh + ns = 1 and, after migration, Nb = (N   rb + (1  ra)) (rb + ra)+ ra + rb, we can
write
Ia = dNb +m = d [DE+ E] +m
where D  (N   rb + (1  ra)) and E  ra + rb
We can write
I = d [FG+HI+ E] +mp
where F  (1  ra   p (1  eL) ;
G  (ra   peL) ;
H  (N   rb + p (1  eL));
I  (rb + peL).
Therefore we obtain easily: Ia   I = m(1  p) + d(DE   FG HI).
Noting that D = H + F and E = G+ I, we can write:
Ia   I = m(1  p) + d(HG+ FI), which is necessarily strictly positive.
b) follows immediately from the denition of the migration threshold;
c) follows from noting that if all individuals in city a migrated to city 1 there would remain no infected
individuals in city a, so migration would no longer be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Lets denote J = Na +Nb
dI
de
= d

dJ
dns
 dns
de
+
dJ
dnh
 dnh
de

+
m
e
dI
de
= d

 (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh) e

e
+  (rb   ra + 2ns) (1  e
)
e

+
m
e
(9)
Substituting nh = e

e (1  e

2 ) and ns =
e2
2e into (9), we nd:
dI
de
= d

e

e(N   1  2rb + 2ra) + rb   ra + 3e
2
e
  2e
3
e

+
m
e
Lets dene
A(e) = d

e

e(N   1  2rb + 2ra) + rb   ra + 3e
2
e
  2e
3
e

+
m
e
dA
de
= d

e

(N   1  2rb + 2ra) + 6e

e
(1  e))

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A(0) = d

e
[rb   ra] + m
e
and A(1) = d

e

(N   1  rb + ra) + 1
e

+
m
e
Given condition (3) holds, we can show easily that A(0) < 0: Moreover A(1) > 0 and dAde > 0:
Therefore there is a unique threshold of exposure factor, emin 2 [0; 1] which minimises I: This threshold
is implicitely determined by dIde = 0:
To show that the laissez faire migration threshold, e, dened by equation (7) is larger than the
optimal threshold, emin, it is su¢ cient to show that dIde > 0:
From equation (9) above, and using the denition of e as being the threshold such that migration
gains are zero, we can show that
dI
de
= d

 (N   1  rb + ra + 2nh) e

e

Therefore dIde > 0:
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